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AGREEMENT.

What will excuse Performance.-In an action to recover damages for
the breach of a contract by which the defendant, in December 1864,
agreed to tow with his steamboat, the plaintiff's sloop and her cargo
from one place on the Hudson river to another, the judge instructed the
jury, in substance, that although navigation was prevented by the act
of God, yet the defendant was liable if, at the time he contracted, he
had reason to apprehend that navigation would be thus prevented before
the contract was to be performed; as he should have provided for such
a contingency in the agreement. Held, that if the freezing of the river
excused the failure of the defendant to perform his contract, the charge
was erroneous: Worth v. Edmonds, 52 Barb.
Held, aZso, that it was unnecessary for the defendant in the agreement
to provide against such a contingency, as the law did it for him. And
that if the evidence in regard to the condition of the river satisfied the
jury that there was a sufficient cause, in such condition, to excuse the
defendant from performance, he was entitled to a verdict: Id.
The freezing of a river is such an act of God as excuses performance
of a, contract to tow a vessel thereon; it being an act to which human
agency does not contribute, and which it cannot control, and therefore
for the consequences of which a party is not responsible: Id.
ATTACHMENT.

Abandonment byp-ior Attaching Creditor.-Both p alntiff and defendant in error had issued attachment against Joseph A. Crew, and
each had served I. S. & Sons with summons of garnishment. The
garnishment in favor of B. & Co. was just served. B. & Co., after Muro
phy had obtained judgment on his attachment, dismissed their attachment in vacation. At the next term of the court, they were permitted
with the consent of the defendant in attachmeni to reinstate their case.
Held, that they lost .their priority over Murphy by dismissing the attachment, and that they could not regain it by reinstating their case: Xur.phy v. Bruce & Co., 38 Georgia.
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BAILMENT.

Pledge by Agent to secure his own Debt.-An agent for the sale of
goods cannot, as against the owner, pledge or mortgage them to a third
party to secure an advance on his own account: FirstNational Bank
of Macon v. Nelson & Co., 38 Georgia.
To constitute a pledge or pawn, under the Code, there must be a
deposit of the thing pawned, and this cannot be dispensed with by a
written agreement., that the party making the pledge will be the bailee
of the pawnee : Id.
BANKS.

Assignment by.-Where a bank made an assignment of its assets for
the benefit of its creditors, and a large portion of the assets was in money
at a market value, and a creditor nearly twelve months after the assignment, filed a creditor's bill, charging that six months after the assignment, and again shortly before the filing of the bill, he had demanded
his share of the cash assets from'the assignees, and they had refused to
pay him unless he would release the bank from the whole of his claim,
and the bill prayed an account. Held, that the bill was not demurrable.
If there was complication or cause for further delay, it ought to be set
up by way of defence, it cannot be assumed: Dobbins v. Porter, 38
Georgia.
COMMON CARRIERS.

Where one transportation company receives from another freight, to
be carried from one place to another, under a contract between the latter and the owner, it is entitled to the benefit of all stipulations in such
contract affecting its liability: Manhattan Oil Company v. The Camden and Amboy Railroad,&c., Company, 52 Barb.
Thus, where freight was delivered to a company, at Cincinnati, under
a contract between the latter company and the owner, to receive the
same and carry it to New York, which contract contained a provision
that the company receiving such freight should not be liable for damage
or loss by fire, or other casualty, while the property was in depots or
places of transhipment; and the property, after being carried by said
company to Philadelphia, was delivered to the defendant, to be carried
by it to New York, and there delivered; and the same having been carried by the defendant to New York and stored in its freight-house there,
was destroyed by fire without any negligence, and before any notice of
its arrival had been given to the owner: Held, that, as the company
receiving the property at Cincinnati would not, under these circumstances, be liable for the value of such property, neither was the defendant liable: Id.
CONFEDERATE NOTES.

See Trustee.

As Considerationfor Contract.-Where a contract was made between
two citizens of the late Confederate States during the war, on the 12th
July 1862, payable three years after date, the consideration of which was
Confederate treasury notes, the only circulating currency at that time,
and which was recognised as lawful by the assumed authority which
had the actual possession and control over the territory and people at
the time the contract was made, Held, that although the issuing of
such notes by the assumed Confederate authority, for the purpose of
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carrying on a war against the government of the United States, may
have been illegal, as against that government and the citizens thereof
who, during the war, were under the actual protection of that government, outside of the lines of the assumed Confederate authority; yet
such a contract made between citizens residing within the lines of the
assumed Confederate authority, in their ordinary business transactions
between themselves, and having no connection with the prosecution of
the war against the United States, is not an illegal consideration, as
between the contractingparties themselves, they having made the contract
under the assumed authority which was then over them, and the assumed
authority (whether rightfully or wrongfully is not now the question)
recognised the currency as legal and valid at the time the contract was
made; therefore as between the contractingparties themselves, the plaintiff below is entitled to recover: Miller v. Gould, 38 Georgia.
CONVEYANCER.

Liability of.-The rule of liability of conveyancers for errors of judg.
ment is the same as lawyers and physicians: Watson v. Muirhead, 57
Penna.
A conveyancer employed (before the decision in Sellers v. Burk, 11
Wright 344) in the purchase of a ground-rent, relying on the opinion
of legal counsel, that it was clear of encumbrances, so represented it to
his principal, there being at the tim a judgment by default against the
vendor, the damages on which had not been liquidated, and under which
it was afterwards sold by the sheriff. Held, that the conveyancer was
not liable to the purchaser for negligence: Id.
To pass the title at that time with such an encumbrance, was not evidence of want of ordinary knowledge and skill and due caution, even if
the conveyabeer had passed it on his own judgment: Id
CORPO0RATION.

Action for Dividends, Evidence.-In an action by a stockholder
against a corporation, to recover a dividend declared by resolution of
the directors in general terms, of so much money per share, evidence
that the earnings of the'corporation werb received in property other than
money, is incompetent, as it alters the legal effect of the resolution ;
which is no more admissible than it would be to alter its terms: Scott
v. The Central Railroadand Banking Company of Georgia, 52 Barb.
Where a corporation makes dividends, payable in dollars, without
any limitation, and without directing the payment to be made in any
currency whatever, the case of .Ehle v. The ChittenargoBank, 24 N.
Y. 548, prevents an inquiry into the means out. of which it determined
to make the dividends. ' The corporation is concluded by the resolutions
directing the dividends. Per INORAHA.M, J. : Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.

illotion in Arrest of Judgment.-The bill of indictment contained but
one count, which was f6r murder. The jury returned a verdict of guilty
of 1,involuntary.manslaughter," which was received by the court and
the jury discharged. A motion was made in arrest of judgment on the
ground' that there are two grades of involuntary manslaughter-one
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punished as a felony, the other by lesser punishment.- Held, that the
motion should have been sustained by the court: Thomas v. The State,
38 Georgia.
Burglam.-Where upon the trial of the defendant charged with the
offence of burglary it was proved that the parties in possession of the
warehouse alleged to have been broken and entered by the defendant,
were in possession of the same under a written contract for rent, or lease,
for a definite period of time: Held, that this parol proof of the possession of the warehouse under written contract for lease or rent at the time
the alleged burglary was committed as charged in the indictment, was
sufficient to sustain that allegation without the production of the written
lease: Houston v. The State, 38 Georgia.
Plea of Autrefois Ac uit.-Where five defendants were indicted for
the offence of an assault, with intent to murder, and after being arrested,
demanded their trial under the provisions of the 4554th section of the
Code, and the state not being ready, were discharged and acquitted by the
judgment of the court, and were afterwards indicted for the same act
of shooting, under the charge and accusation of an "aggravated nature,"
and to the second indictment the defendants, on being arraigned, filed
the plea of autrefois acquit, to which plea the counsel for the state
demurred, 6iid the court below sustained the demurrer, and decided that
the defendant's plea was not a good bar: Held, that the court erred in
sustaining the demurrer to the defendant's plea: olt v. The State, 38
Georgia.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Rigit of Subsequent Creditors to impeach a Conccance.-If, at the
time a conveyance is made, there is no person competent to question its
validity, the title will vest in the grantee absolutely, as against all the
world. Subsequent creditors of the grantor cannot reach it in such a
case, as the foundation upon which their rights are held to attach to
property once owned by their debtor does not exist. It is only when a
conveyance is void, or voidable, as to creditors, when made, that subsequent creditors of the grantor can attach it on that ground alone. It is
not, in such a case, a bondfide conveyance to the grantee, either as to
prior or subsequent creditors: Baker v. Gilman, 52 Barb.
Who is a SU'eguent Creditor.-The defendant being sued in actions
for slander, retained the plaintiff, an attorney, to defend those actions.
Three days afterwards, the defendant conveyed his property to a third
person, for the purpose of defeating the claims of the plaintiffs in the
slander suits, should any be established. Soon afterwards the plaintiff
was informed of such conveyance by the grantor, and of its object.
Only a small portion of the plaintiff's demand had then been earned.
He went on defending the actions without objection for more than a
year, when they were determined in the defendant's favor. Eeld, that
the credit was not given by the plaintiff upon the faith of the defendant's ownership of the property conveyed, and that his dimand being
embraced in a judgment recovered nearly two years after the conveyance, be was clearly a subsequent creditor of the defendant: 11.
Who ma/y irnprcu.-A creditor who has trusted his debtor after
being fully informed by the latter that he has put his property out of
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his hands, by a conveyance valid as between him and his grantee, though
voidable as to existing creditors, should not be allowed to come into
court and claim that such conveyance was fraudulent and void as to him,
on account of such indebtedness: Id. "
As to such creditor, a conveyance of that kind would not be fraudulent in any sense, and cannot be avoided on that ground: Id.
See Partnership,-Sheriff.
Fraud-Paymentin Confederate Mone.-Plaintiff in the courtbelow
sold to defendants four bales of cotton while Confederate money was the
currency and had a market value, and was to receive that currency in
payment. Defendants delayed payment until the Confederate armies
had surrendered, when one of them, with knowledge of the surrender,
visited the plaintiff at his residence in the country, and paid the debt
in Confederate currency, at a time when plaintiff swears he had no knowledge of the surrender. Held, in such case, that it is a question proper
for the jury to determine whether defendant practised a fraud upon
plaintiff. by taking advantage of his ignorance, and misleading him to
receive the notes in payment when defendants knew they were in fact
of no value by reason of the failure of the Confederacy: Blalock et al.
v. Pillpis,38 Georgia.
EXECUTION.

HirHwAY.

See Municipal Corporation.

HUSBAND

AND WIFE.

Wife's S parate Estate-Bill of Sale void as to Creditors.-The
receipt and appropriation by a husband of money, constituting the separate estate of his wife, with her knowledge and acquiescence, does not
establish the relation of debtor and creditor between them, and entitle
the wife to compensation out of the husband's assets, unless at the time
of such receipt he expressly agreed to repay the money so received and
appropriated: Kukn v. Stansfield, 28 Id.
A husband voluntarily executed a bill of sale, to secure to his wife a
sum of money, constituting her separate ,estate, which he had received
with her knowledge and acquiescence, and invested in his business, but
which, at the time of such receipt, he did not agree to repay. .Held:
That such conveyance was void'as to prior creditors, it not appearing
that the debtor had other property sufficient to satisfy them: Id.
INSURANCE.

Factorj-Mill-- What are meant bty.-A policy of insurance on a
building had this condition: "The following risks being considered
more hazardous than others, buildings intended to be occupied by persons carrying on any of the undermentioned trades or business, or in
which any large quantities of the undermentioned goods are deposited,
will be subjected to an extra premium on that account. No policy,'
therefore, will be construed to extend to such a risk, unless liberty be
given for the purpose, and expressed thereon." One of the specifications of such risks was, "mills and manufactories of any kind." With
the consent of the company the tenant kept hay, straw, produce, &c.;
this he gave up and kept broom-corn and made brooms by hand. Held,
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this did not come within the prohibition of "mills and manufactories :"
FranklinIns. Co. *. Brock, 57 Penna.
A mill within the meaning of the prohibition is not merely a place
where something might be ground, nor a manufactory merely where
something may be made by hand or machinery, but what common usage
recognises as a mill or manufactory respectively: Id.
Two adjoining houses of the same owner were insured by one company
at the same time, but in two distinct policies. Held, that the policies
were distinct contracts, and that the assured could recover for damage
by fire to one building, although the other building may have been used
in a manner prohibited by the policy and the fire originated in it: Id.
A premium for insurance above the usual rate, is evidence indicating
though not proving that a more than usual risk was assumed; but a jury
should not infer that a concealed or misrepresented fact was to be at the
risk of the insurers: Id.
Describing a building insured as a "storehouse," is descriptive only,
and not a warranty or representation that nothing should be done in it
but keeping a store or a storehouse : Id.
A storewuse was insured, and keeping broom-corn was not specified
as a hazardous risk; the assured had a right to keep broom-corn there.
Keeping it did not prevent his recovery for damage to the building by
fire, because the danger was greater by keeping it, or because the fire
originated in it: Id.
A policy enumerating certain risks as hazardous, does not cover any
of them unless liberty be given to keep the articles, &c., mentioned as
hazardous: Id.
If words in a policy are of doubtful signification, the meaning most
favorable to the assured is to be adopted: Id.
JURISDICTION.

Appeal-Limited 7urisdictio.-The right of appeal from the decisions of the Commissioners for Opening Streets, being given to the
Criminal Court of Baltimore, it is the exclusive province of that court
to determine whether such an appeal has been regularly and properly
taken, and its judgment thereon is final and conclusive, no right of
appeal therefrom having been given by statute: Rundle v. Baltimore,
28 31d.
If no appellate power had been conferred on the Criminal Court of
Baltimore in such cases, its judgments unwarrantably pronounced in
assertion of jurisdiction over the subject, might by appeal be reviewed
and reversed in this court: Id.
The -Criminal Court of Baltimore, in reference to proceedings had
therein, on appeal from the decision of the Commissioners for Opening
Streets, is clothed only with a special and limited jurisdiction, to be
exercised in a particular manner, and not according to the course of the
common law; and from a judgment rendered in the exercise of such
special jurisdiction, in the absence of express right given by statute, no
appeal will lie to this court, whether the judgment be pronounced in
the exercise of original jurisdiction, or on appeal from some inferior
authority: Id.
LAND.

Right to Borefor Ol-CorporealInterest.-An agreement to lease
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land for a term of years, with the exclusive right to bore for and collect
oil, giving one-fourth to the lessor : Held, to pass a corporeal interest:
The Chicago, &c., Oil Co. v. U. S. Petroleum Co., 57 Penna.
The taking by the lessee of his share of the oil found is not waste,
but a rightful act, unless the lease be forfeited by its own terms: Id.
Where a party has title and possession under a lease in writing, enjoying rights apparently legal, a receiver will not be appointed unless under
urgent and peculiar circumstances. The plaintiff must show a clear
right or apriridfacie right, with such circumstances of danger or probable loss as will move the conscience of a chancellor to interfere: Id.
LICENSE.

See Land.

Lis PENDENS.

P'cndency of a Suit in a Court of another State.-While it is settldd,
that for all national purposes embraced by the Federal Constitution, the
states and the citizens thereof constitute one government, united under
the same sovereign authority, and governed by the same laws, yet in all
other respects and for all other purposes, the several states retain their
individual sovereignties, and with respect to their municipal regulations,
are to each other foreign: Seevers v. Clement, 28 Md.
In legal contemplation the jurisdiction of the courts of Pennsylvania
is foreign to the jurisdiction of those of Maryland: -d.
At the common law the rule is well established, that the pendency of
a prioi suit in yersonam in a foreign court, between the same parties,
for the same cause of action is .no sufficient cause for stay or bar of a suit
instituted in one of our own courts. It is only the definitive judgment
on the merits that will be considered conclusive: Id.
This rule has been frequently and upon good and sufficient reasons
declared to obtain in all its force, both by Federal and state courts, in
regard to actions pending in another state of the Union: Id.
MORTGAGES.

Delivery-Date.-The date of a mortgage is the day of its delivery,
and that day may be shbwn by parol nbtwithstanding a different date
be on the face of the deed: Russell v. Carr, 38 Georgia.
Two mortgages executed in the same day are of equal date, and, if
both are recorded in time, are entitled to sharepro 7atd in a fund not
sufficient to satisfy them both: Id.
The law will not note fractions of a day except to prevent injustice,
and in cases specially provided by law: Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
l'regqlgence.Highway.-A municipal corporation, the owner of a market, the stalls of which it rents, is bound to keep the pavements in front
of the stalls in a safe condition, and if a citizen of the' corporation is
injured through a neglect of this duty by the officers of the corporation,
the corporation is liable to the extend of the injury received: The City
of Savannah v. Culles anl Wife, 38 Georgia.
NEGLIGENCE. See Municipal Corporation.
Injury to Dam by Matter thrown in the Stream.-A dam was filled
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by deposits or coal-dirt from different mines on the stream above the
dam, some worked by defendants and their tenants and others by persons entirely unconnected with the defendants. The court charged in
substance that if at the time the defendants were throwing coal-dirt into
the river, the same thing was being done at other collieries and they
knew of it, they were liable for the combined results of all the deposits.
Held, to be erroneous: Little Schuylkill .rav. Co. v. Richards, 57
Penna.
The ground of the action is not the deposit of the dirt in the dam by
the stream, but the negligent act above: Id.
Throwing the dirt into the stream is the tort, the deposit is only the
consequence: Id.
The liability of the defendants began with their act on their own land,
and was wholly separate and independent of concert with others. Their
tort was several when committed, and did not become joint because its
consequences united with other consequences: Id.
The defendants are not liable .for acts of their tenants, not done by
their authority or command: Id.
Infant-Duty of .Parent.-Though an infant of tender years may
recover for an injury, partly caused by his own imprudent act, the father
cannot: Glasseyi v. Hestonville R. Co., 57 Penna.
It makes no difference whether the injury was to the father's absolute
or relative rights : Id.
Protection being a paternal duty, entire failure to extend it is negligence: Id.
If a father permits a child of tender years to run at large, without a
protector, in a city traversed constantly by cars and other vehicles, he
fails in the performance of his duty and is guilty of negligence: Id.
The fact that a young child having parents, is found alone and unprotected in the street, is presumptive evidence that he was so exposed
voluntarily or negligently by his protectors: Id.
It is the duty of the parent at all times to shield his child from danger, and this duty is the greater when the risk is imminent; the degree
of protection. is in proportion to the helplessness and indiscretion of the
child: Id.
In fant.-To a child of tender years no contributory negligence can
be imputed: N. P. R. Co. v. Mahoney, 57 Penna.
A person not in charge of a child of tender years, took it into her
arms with intention to protect it, fell with it on a railroad track and the
child was injured by the engine. An action would lie against such person at the suit of the child, but the negligence of such person was not
contributory negligence on the part of the child so. as to discharge the
railroad company, their servants having also been negligent: d.
NUISANCE.

Indictment for.-A person who shall erect or continue (after notice
to abate) any nuisance which tends to annoy the community, or injure
the health of the citizens in general, or to corrupt the public morals, is
liable to indictment under the penal code of this state. This legal
offence of continuing a nuisance is not complete before notice to abate.
And until the notice is given and the legal offence is complete, the city
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authorities have power, as a police regulation, to punish for the continuance of such nuisance, as would subject the offender to indictment after
notice to abate. But where the offence is complete they have only the
power to bind over the offender to the proper court to answer for the
offence: Vason v. The City of Augusta, 38 Georgia.
A landlord who has leased premises to a tenant is "notliable for a
nuisance maintained upon the premises by a tenant during the lease.
If the nuisance existed on the premises when the lease was made, the
landlord is liable. But if the tenant continues the nuisance after he
obtains exclusive possession and control, he alone is liable for its continuance. As lhe landlord, under our statute, is liable for necessary
repairs on the premises, if the nuisance grows out of his neglect to make
the repairs, the tenant may make them, and set off the reasonable value
against the rent due the landlord: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.

Lien of Creditorson separateandjoint roperty.-Cake took a mortgage on Snyder's interest in laud, appearing by the record to be held in
common with Bergstresser, without notice that it was partnership property. He afterwards took another mortgage on the land from Snyder
and Bergstresser, for a partnership debt; and at the same time Snyder
confessed to Cako a judgment on his individual property, as collateral
security for the latter mortgage. The land was sold under both mortgages,, but did not pay the debts. Held, that the collateral judgment
was not extinguished by the sale: Vandike's Appeal, 57 Penna.
The personal property of the partnership was sold on an execution on
the judgment against Snyder and on executions against Bergstresser.
Held, that the proceeds should be divided between the executions against
Snyder and those against Bergstresser: Id.
When partnership property is sold under separate executions against
the partners individually, the proceeds represent the several interests of
the partners and not that of the partnership: Id.
REcEIVER.

See Land.

SEDUCTION.

Pleading and Evidence in Actionfor.-In an action on the case by a
father for the seduction of his daughter, under twenty-one years of age,
per guod servitium amisit, the relation of master and servant, at the
time of the seduction, must be averred in pleading, and established by
proof: Greenwood v. Oreenwood, 28 Md.
A farther may maintain an action for debauching his daughter, under
age, per guod servitium amisit, although she was not living with him at
the time the offence was committed, unless by some act of his own, he
has destroyed the relation of master and servant, which the law implies
from the legal control he has over her services: Id.
SHERIFF.

Right to return "Nulla Bona" where Title is doubtful-FalseBeturin-In an action for a false return of "nul la bona," unless it appear
that the property pointed out belonged to the defendant in the execu-
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tion, an offer to indemnify the sheriff will not make him liable: Commonwealth ex rel. Hood v. Vandyke, 57 Penna.
The Interpleader Act of April 10th 1848 is not imperative on the
sheriff; but it affords him a means of relieving himself from responsibility. He may take the risk of returning "nulla bona" or levying and
selling: d.
When there is a claim of property adverse to the defendants which
would raise a reasonable doubt as to title, or create a pause in the mind
of a constant man, the sheriff has a right to call on the plaintiff for
indemnity, and if refused, may ask the court to enlarge the time for his
return till indemnity be given: Id.
Whether the insufficiency of the indemnity, although it may justify
no return,'is a defence to an action for false return. Dubitatur,per
SBARSWOOD, J.: Id.
A sheriff has a right to require that the sureties in a bond of indemnity to him should reside in his county: Id.
Whether the indemnity is reasonable ought not to be too broadly submitted to the jury without instructions, but is within the province of
the court, leaving the facts, if disputed, to the jury: Id.
STAMP.

Letters-7When to be tampted.-A debtor placed a note due him in
the hands of a creditor to receive the amount, and afterwards wrote to
another creditor that he should receive his debt from the proceeds of the
note after the first creditor should lie paid; the second creditor, by direction of the debtor, showed the letter to the first, who promised to pay
the money when received. Held, that the letter was not an instrument
requiring a revenue stamp: Boyd v. Rood, 57 Penna.
A tax law cannot be extended by construction to things.not described
as the subject of taxation: Id.
A letter in the character of a substantial instrument cannot be used
to evade taxation: Id.
.Accidental Omission to Stamp at the Proper Time.-A note having
been executed at a time when the parties did not know it was necessary
to place a revenue stamp upon it, and on the fact being ascertained, the
maker having voluntarily placed the necessary stamp on the note, and
again delivered it to the payee, whereby the government received the
revenue to which it was entitled, the maker will not now be allowed to
controvert the fact that the note was legally stamped: Green v. Lowry,
38 Georgia.
SURETY.
Discharge of.-As Congress has the power, under the Constitution, to
establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the
United States, and as the Act of Congress forbids the prosecution of an
action against a person adjudged a bankrupt, until the question of his
discharge has been determined, and relieves him, when discharged, from
all debts, liabilities, &c., which might have been proved against his
estate; a surety on an appeal bond in this state is no longer liable, when
the principal is discharged in bankruptey, which discharge of the principal terminates the case pending in the state courts against him, and
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prevents any judgment. The surety on the appeal does not contract to
pay the debt, but the judgment that may be entered in the suit then
pending: Odell v. brootcn, 38 Georgia.
TRUSTEES.

Ordinay Care by.-A trustee in possession of the trust property, is
only bound to ordinary diligence in its preservation and protection:
Campbell v. Ailler, 38 Georgia.
If the trust property consists of promissory notes 'the trustee may
receive payment of the notes when due, in such currency as a prudent
man would receive for debts due him under similar circumstances: Id.
If the trustee changes the investment with the consent of the eestui
que trust who is of legal age, he is not liable for any loss growing out of
any such new investment: Id.
VENDOR AND

PURCHASER.

Constructive Dellver#y-Sy
1 mbolical Delivers,- Fendor's Lien-Stoppage in Transitu as between Trendor and endee.-A quantity of pig
iron lying in piles at a furnace and on the road was sold, and the parcels
constituting the whole were pointed out and shown by the agent of the
vendor to the agent of the vendees, and the whole was charged in the
books of the vendor to the vendees by their agent, under the direction
of the vendor. Held: That these acts being done with the intent and
for the purpose of making delivery, constituted such a constructive
delivery as would pass the title to the vendees: Thompson v. B. & 0.
R. R. Co., 28 Md.
Where ponderous articles incapable in the ordinary course of business
of actual manual delivery, are the subject of sale, symbolical or constructive delivery is sufficient, and such constructive delivery may be implied
from the acts of the parties: Id.
There is a marked distinction between those acts, which as between
vendor and vendor, upon a contract of sale, go to make a constictive
delivery and to vest the property in the vendee, and that actual delivery
by the vendor to the vendee, which puts an end to the right of the vendor to hold the goods as security for the price; and the law in holding
that a vendor who has given credit for goods, waives his lien for the
price, does so on one implied condition, which is, that the vendee shall
keep his credit good. If, therefore, before payment, the vendee become
bankrupt or insolvent, and the vendor still retains the custody of the
goods, or any part of them; or if the goods are in the hands of a carrier, or middleman, on their way to the vendee, and have not yet got
into his actual possession, and the vendor, before they do so, can regain
his actual possession, by a stoppage in, transitu,then his lien is restored,
and he may hold the goods as security for the price: 17d.
The lien of the vendor always exists until he voluntarily and utterly
resigns the possession of the goods sold, and all right'to detain them.
So long as the vendor does not 'surrender actual possession, his lien
remains, although he may have performed acts which amount to a conclusive delivery, so as to pass the title or avoid the statute: Id.
In all cases of symbolical delivery, which is the only species of constructive delivery sufficient to give a final possession to the vendee, it
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is only because of the manifest intention of the vendor utterly to abandon
all claim and right of possession, taken in connection with the difficulty
or impossibility of making an actual and manual transfer, that such a
delivery is considered as sufficient to annul the lien of the vendor: 1L.
When Title does notpass.-The title to property sold does not pass
to the vendee, where anything remains to be done in order to ascertain
the precise property sold or the price to be paid: Camp v. -rorton et
aL., 52 Barb.
But whether the kind, or the quantity of property has been ascertained, so as to pass the title, are facts to be proved in each case, and
cannot, ordinarily, arise upon a complaint properly drawn: Id.
Complaint in Actio n for Refusal to Deliver.-In an action by a vendee against the vendor to recover damages for not delivering the property sold, it is only necessary for him to aver, in his complaint, the
making of the contract, performance or readiness to perform, on his part,
and neglect or refusal to deliver, on the part of the vendor after demand,
when demand is required by the contract: Id.
Separating, Weighing or Measuring of Property.-Thereis no presumption of law that property sold has not been separated, weighed or
measured, so as to pass the title. If these'acts are not done, it devolves
on the party insisting on these omissions to show them, and thus discharge himself from a liability which would otherwise devolve upon
him: Id.
WASTE.

Opinionpf Witness-- Cutting of Timber.-In an action for waste, a
witness must state facts, and while he may give his opinion accompanied
by the facts upon which it is predicated, as to the number of acres from
which the timber has been cut, the value of the land before and after
it was cut, the whole number of acres in the tract, the-proportion of the
timbered land, and the like; it is error in the court to permit him to
give in evidence his opinion that the estate of the remainderman has
been damaged a certain amount by the acts of the defendant. It is the
province of the jury to draw from the facts stated, their own conclusion
as to the amount of damage, if any, sustained by the plaintiff: Woodward v. Gates et al., 38 Georgia.
The stringent rules of the English laws relative to waste were not
applicable to our condition, and were not embraced in our adopting
statute. It is not always waste for a tenant for life to cut growing timber or clear land. Regard must be had to the condition of the premises;
and the proper question for the jury to decide under the instructions of
the court will be, did good husbandry require the felling of the trees,
and were the acts such as a judicious, prudent owner of the inheritance
would have committed: Id.
WITNESS.

Xileage.-A witness for the state in a criminal case, who, in obedience to a subpoena served upon him while temporarily in this state,
actually comes from his home in a distgat state, wh;re he resided when
the subpoena was served upon him, and testifies in the case, is entitled

